1 · An answer
Verify before acting
Every Resolve answer and decision receipt carries signature.kid. Accept it only when that kid is in the signed directory, then check the signature over the document’s SHA-256.
Each Ed25519 key in the directory has one purpose: one signs the requests CrawlCheck sends under its own name, one signs documents (Resolve answers, site staples, DNS records, certificates), one signs decision receipts and one signs the heads of the answer log. Accept a signature only when its key is in the published directory with the purpose the table below gives for what it signed; for a document made before a key existed, the signing policy below names the key that was valid then; when it rotates, the history below says which key was valid when.
hcIAczGf
active key (JWK thumbprint)
7
days of overlap on rotation
8
key events, hash-chained
intact
chain, checked from the first entry
Each check runs on your own machine.
1 · An answer
Every Resolve answer and decision receipt carries signature.kid. Accept it only when that kid is in the signed directory, then check the signature over the document’s SHA-256.
2 · Our crawler
Requests made under CrawlCheck’s own name carry HTTP Message Signatures (Web Bot Auth). A site can verify the signature against this key instead of maintaining an address range.
3 · An old signature
A signature made before a rotation verifies against the key that made it. The log below says when each key started and stopped signing, and every entry hashes the one before it.
Each key in the directory carries crawlcheck_purpose.
| Key (thumbprint) | Purpose | Signs | Held in | Valid from |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| hcIAczGf-8EFBnku… | requests | the HTTP Message Signatures (Web Bot Auth) on requests CrawlCheck sends under its own name, and this directory | an encrypted secret | 2026-09-11 20:24 UTC |
| 1hHmE3fo1rg5Ig70… | documents | Resolve answers, site staples, DNS records, certificates, remediation receipts, evidence manifests | an encrypted secret | 2026-10-10 14:25 UTC |
| NP5GewowKgJmU_IT… | decisions | decision receipts (POST /api/v1/preflight) | an encrypted secret | 2026-10-10 17:58 UTC |
| AqR_NNfBCBE0A_KX… | log heads | the signed tree heads of the answer log | an encrypted secret | 2026-10-10 18:00 UTC |
Every signed message also carries its own prefix (answers crawlcheck-data-v1, manifests crawlcheck-meg-manifest-v1, certificates crawlcheck-certificate-v1, DNS records crawlcheck-dns-v1), so a signature made for one kind of document can never be presented as another. Decision receipts and log heads have keys of their own, signing since 2026-11-09 17:00 UTC: a verifier must accept a receipt whose resolve answer, or an answer whose log head, is signed by another published key. The verifier, @crawlcheck/sdk 1.3.0 and crawlcheck 1.3.0 for Python, and every later release, do; older ones require the keys to match and must be updated. A compromise of the request key, the one used on the open network, does not reach the key that signs answers. Any key can be declared compromised on its own; a compromised document key falls back to the request key until it is replaced, and every answer names the key that signed it.
The one rule set every verifier and SDK follows. As JSON (signing_policy).
| What is signed | Key purpose | From | If that key is compromised | Verifying older documents |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HTTP requests CrawlCheck sends under its own name (Web Bot Auth), and the key directory itself | requests | 2026-09-11 | Replaced by a new request key; nothing falls back. Until one is installed CrawlCheck sends no signed requests. | Requests are checked when they arrive, never later. |
| Resolve answers, site staples, DNS records, certificates, evidence receipts and manifests | documents | 2026-10-10 | The request key signs them until a new document key is installed; each document names the key that signed it. | Accept the document when signature.kid is in the directory with purpose documents, or with purpose requests for an answer whose log head that key signed (answers logged before 2026-10-10). |
| Decision receipts (preflight) | documents until 2026-11-09 17:00 UTC, then decisions | 2026-11-09 17:00 UTC | The document key signs them until a new decision key is installed. | Before the switch a receipt is signed by the key that signed the Resolve answer it names. After it, the receipt and its answer may carry different keys; both must be in the directory. |
| Answer-log tree heads | documents until 2026-11-09 17:00 UTC, then log heads | 2026-11-09 17:00 UTC | The document key signs them until a new log key is installed. | A tree head is accepted when its key is in the directory with purpose log heads, or documents for heads signed before the switch. |
| Any document, when no uncompromised key is left | none | Signing stops. Answers are withheld, never signed with a compromised key; an unsigned answer fails every verifier. |
A retired key leaves the directory when its 7-day overlap ends and stays in the rotation record (retired[], with stopped_signing_at): a document it signed at or before that moment still verifies, nothing it signed later does. A key declared compromised fails every signature made after the moment it was compromised from (compromised_since), whatever its purpose. A rotation publishes the new key 7 days before the old one stops signing. A valid signature means the document is authentic; it is not permission to act. What to do is the decision inside it.
The same policy as data: signing_policy.machine in the rotation record (which key purpose may sign which document, and from when). crawlcheck-verify.mjs applies it as code and prints key policy valid or the reason it is not: key_wrong_purpose, key_not_yet_active, key_retired, key_compromised or key_unknown. --online reads this directory and the rotation record; --keys with --rotation checks against copies you saved, with no network, and knows nothing revoked after you saved them.
| Thumbprint (JWK, SHA-256) | hcIAczGf-8EFBnkunmZlvFWnD2nHHeHeC9cM4BTiBVo |
| Valid from | 2026-09-11 20:24 UTC |
| Signs | every request sent under our own name and the key directory. Documents are signed by the document key (see the signing policy); this key also stays on answers logged before 2026-10-10, and on the decision receipts that name them |
| Overlap on rotation | 7 days: a new key is published before the old one stops signing, and the old one stays listed after |
| Thumbprint | Valid from | Stopped signing | Private half erased | Why |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0zNVreNVKdaTFJjtRJtvcFiesmG2qgWvvIBL_zbgwko | 2026-08-21 03:07 | 2026-09-18 20:24 | 2026-09-19 01:17 | moved to sealed secret storage |
Times are UTC. A key stops signing when the overlap ends; its private half is erased at the next sweep after that, and its public half stays listed so old signatures still verify.
Chain intact (checked from the genesis entry); coverage complete: every key the directory publishes has an entry.
| # | When (UTC) | Event | Key | Reason | Entry hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | 2026-10-10 18:17:44 | active | AqR_NNfBCBE0A_KX… | log-head signing key (signed tree heads of the answer log); published 2026-10-10T18:00:45.000Z, signs from 2026-11-09T17:00:00Z (not an overlap rotation: an earlier entry said so in error) | 83ad28f9a692f904… |
| 6 | 2026-10-10 18:17:42 | active | NP5GewowKgJmU_IT… | decision-signing key (decision receipts); published 2026-10-10T17:58:58.000Z, signs from 2026-11-09T17:00:00Z (not an overlap rotation: an earlier entry said so in error) | 2275171ae597a993… |
| 5 | 2026-10-10 18:02:19 | publishing | AqR_NNfBCBE0A_KX… | published during overlap rotation; created 2026-10-10T18:00:45.000Z | 1d80ad1c07f62a39… |
| 4 | 2026-10-10 18:02:19 | publishing | NP5GewowKgJmU_IT… | published during overlap rotation; created 2026-10-10T17:58:58.000Z | b870dde0c4e18f7a… |
| 3 | 2026-10-10 14:30:17 | active | 1hHmE3fo1rg5Ig70… | document-signing key (Resolve answers, decision receipts, staples, DNS records, log heads); created 2026-10-10T14:25:23.000Z | a1e08a6136bead4f… |
| 2 | 2026-09-18 21:17:40 | retired | 0zNVreNVKdaTFJjt… | moved to sealed secret storage | 8b9e4f47245c3324… |
| 1 | 2026-09-16 12:26:27 | publishing | 0zNVreNVKdaTFJjt… | published during overlap rotation; created 2026-08-21T03:07:11.000Z | 08d7e8ec87b75230… |
| 0 | 2026-09-12 04:42:56 | active | hcIAczGf-8EFBnku… | e092e9199a0eee49… |
Head 83ad28f9a692f90428afd7b8ae9551d95e605cd032afb3e81c9a0361bf06fbd3. The log began on 2026-09-12; its first entry records the key that was already active.
Signing is on. No key has ever been declared compromised.
One action replaces the key. A new key is made and installed, the old key is declared compromised from the earliest moment it could have leaked, and the old key leaves the directory. There is no overlap: nothing signs with the old key again. Until the replacement is installed, the next key in the signing policy takes over: a compromised decision or log key hands its documents to the document key, and a compromised document key hands them to the request key. Only when no uncompromised key is left does signing stop: every answer is then withheld rather than signed with a bad key, and an unsigned answer fails every verifier, which is the safe failure.
| Where you look | What changes | Within |
|---|---|---|
| Key directory | The key is no longer listed, so an online check reports the issuer as untrusted | 60 s |
| Everything CrawlCheck signs | Nothing is signed with the key again; a declared key can never sign, even if it is installed again | 60 s |
| Rotation record | compromised[] names the key, compromised_since, the reason and what it invalidates; signing says on or paused | at once |
| Key log | A chained compromised event, sealed into that day’s anchored root | at once |
| Site staples cached at the edge | Old staples stop verifying until the site fetches a fresh one | 6 h |
Online verifiers
A verifier that checks signature.kid against the directory rejects the key as soon as it is removed. Ask again and the new key signs the new answer.
Offline verifiers
Refresh the directory or the rotation record at least daily and reject any kid listed in compromised[]. Receipts are short-lived (minutes to a day), so a cached decision expires on its own.
Older documents
A document signed before compromised_since stays provable only through an anchor the key cannot forge: the day’s Bitcoin seal or an answer-log head held by a witness we run on GitHub before that time. A signature alone proves nothing for that key any more.
Public code is searched for CrawlCheck licence keys every hour. A leaked key is rotated: the holder uses Rotate my key on /manage, or CrawlCheck rotates it with no grace period. The old key is refused at once; reports, watches and history stay on the licence. A licence key never signs anything an agent verifies, so a leak never changes what an answer proves.
Suspect a leak of either kind? Write to hello@crawlcheck.io or use the security form (security.txt). Machine-readable: compromise_procedure in the rotation record points here.
Each entry hashes {at, event, prev, reason, seq, storage, thumbprint} as canonical JSON with sorted keys; its prev is the hash of the entry before it, and the first entry points at 64 zeroes. Recompute the chain and it must reach head. A key that signed something last month appears here even if it no longer appears in the directory.
Daily anchor: since 2026-10-04 the head hash is a leaf in each day’s sealed Merkle root, timestamped with OpenTimestamps: /api/seal/lookup?id=keys-head&day=YYYY-MM-DD.