Agent view · Findings · 2026-09-30
Our security headers skipped every signed-in session
This is the response this server returns to a client that asks for Accept: text/markdown at https://crawlcheck.io/blog/our-security-headers-skipped-every-signed-in-session: fetched when you opened this page, shown byte for byte. An assistant, a crawler that negotiates markdown, or anything reading our feed gets exactly this. The markdown leaves signed (RFC 9421, key in our key directory), so a crawler can prove the page it read is the page this server sent; the check is shown below.
| status | 200 |
|---|---|
| content-type | text/markdown; charset=utf-8 |
| vary | Accept |
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| cache-control | public, max-age=900, stale-while-revalidate=2400 |
| bytes | 12,820 |
| words | 1,736 |
| sha-256 | 236f81fa530512bab9ec88c1696898e38ffa5afd035c47b7f6c197b66380a266 |
| repr-digest | sha-256=:I2+B+lMFErq57IjBaWiY44/6Wv0DXEe39sGXtmOAomY=: ← matches the body shown |
| signature-input | sig1=("@authority";req "@path";req "repr-digest" "content-type");created=1795182372;expires=1795185972;keyid="1hHmE3fo1rg5Ig70wuFtJ5wBc7G-sUTgUJkxyPWFRps";alg="ed25519";nonce="kdzce3dL1eCMLTmb2G2PYg";tag="crawlcheck-page" |
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| verified | yes — signature by key 1hHmE3fo1rg5Ig70… from https://crawlcheck.io/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory (directory valid), valid for 3600 more s. Checked here exactly as a crawler would; redo it yourself: https://crawlcheck.io/api/tool/wba |
Findings · 2026-09-30 · By [VSNARY | Emmanuel Orta](/author) # Our security headers skipped every signed-in session A new Content-Security-Policy and tighter CORS headers were checked live and called done. Signed-in sessions received neither. The check had only ever looked signed out. On 24 September 2026 crawlcheck.io added a report-only Content-Security-Policy and tighter CORS headers, checked them on signed-out page loads and called the work done. Signed-in sessions received neither: a coding error in the step that prepares signed-in pages left the header steps after it with nothing to attach headers to, while the page itself still loaded normally. It was fixed the same day. Every header or access change is now tested both signed in and signed out before it counts as shipped. On this page - What did a signed-in visitor get? - Why did nobody notice? - What was fixed, and was anything exposed? - How do you check your own headers both ways? Which sessions got the security headers Signed out CSP header applied Tighter CORS applied Checked before release? yes Signed in, before the fix CSP header absent Tighter CORS absent Checked before release? no Signed in, after the fix CSP header applied Tighter CORS applied Checked before release? yes On 24 September 2026 crawlcheck.io shipped two security changes in one afternoon: a [Content-Security-Policy](/glossary/content-security-policy) in report-only mode, and a tightening of the CORS headers so that credentialed cross-origin requests were answered only where intended. Both were verified on the live site. Both were verified signed out. For every signed-in session, neither change was applied. ## What did a signed-in visitor get? # | Session | CSP header | Tighter CORS | Checked before release? | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Signed out | applied | applied | yes | | Signed in, before the fix | absent | absent | no | | Signed in, after the fix | applied | applied | yes | Signed-in pages go through one extra preparation step that signed-out pages skip. A coding error in that step meant the steps after it, the ones that add the two headers, received something that was not yet a finished page. They found no headers to change and passed it along unchanged. The page was completed just before sending, so it looked and worked exactly as before, without the new headers. ## Why did nobody notice? # Three things hid it. Signed-in pages behaved normally. The policy was in report-only mode, so even where it was applied nothing was blocked, and where it was absent nothing looked different. And the verification fetched the changed pages anonymously, read the new headers and stopped. A single signed-in fetch would have caught it. It was found the same afternoon by re-reading the code while preparing another change, and one signed-in request confirmed it. ## What was fixed, and was anything exposed? # The error was fixed in the next release the same day, and the check was rerun signed in and signed out on pages whose content differs between the two. When the policy later moved from report-only to enforced, that switch was tested both ways first. No data was exposed: the handling of private content on signed-in pages ran correctly throughout, and the missing CORS tightening only restricted a kind of credentialed cross-origin request that no legitimate client makes. It is published because the change was announced as live and was not live for the sessions it mattered most for. ## How do you check your own headers both ways? # Fetch the same page twice and compare the headers: once plain with `curl -sI https://example.com/account`, and once with your session cookie copied from the browser, using `-H "Cookie: …"`. Look for `content-security-policy` (or its report-only variant), `strict-transport-security` and the `access-control-` headers in both. Do it for every header, gate or middleware change, on a page that differs signed in. The rollout itself, from report-only to enforced, is in the [CSP rollout guide](/guides/content-security-policy-rollout-report-only-to-enforced), and the transport header is covered in the [HSTS audit guide](/guides/hsts-audit-missing-header-preload-ineligible-and-removed-entries). This is one of the corrections CrawlCheck publishes when its own output was wrong. [All of them are listed together](/blog?kind=corrections). **Live, as you read this:** the corpus now holds 570,959 domains across 9,163 scans. The figures in this piece were measured on the date above; this line is not. CrawlCheck’s dataset when this page loaded: 570,959 sites measured. Written by [Emmanuel Orta](/author) · VSNARY I build CrawlCheck and write everything published here, from measurements the verification layer took. Where a post got something wrong, the correction stays in the post. [Every post, and where I got it wrong →](/author) · [Follow on LinkedIn →](https://www.linkedin.com/in/emmanuelorta) Share this finding: [LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/sharing/share-offsite/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcrawlcheck.io%2Fblog%2Four-security-headers-skipped-every-signed-in-session%3Futm_source%3Dlinkedin%26utm_medium%3Dsocial%26utm_campaign%3Dshare)[X](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcrawlcheck.io%2Fblog%2Four-security-headers-skipped-every-signed-in-session%3Futm_source%3Dx%26utm_medium%3Dsocial%26utm_campaign%3Dshare&text=Our%20security%20headers%20skipped%20every%20signed-in%20session)[Email](mailto:?subject=Our%20security%20headers%20skipped%20every%20signed-in%20session&body=https%3A%2F%2Fcrawlcheck.io%2Fblog%2Four-security-headers-skipped-every-signed-in-session)[Follow Emmanuel on LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/emmanuelorta) ## Questions this post answers ### What went wrong with CrawlCheck's security headers? For one release on 24 September 2026, a new Content-Security-Policy and tighter CORS headers reached signed-out visitors but not signed-in sessions, because a coding error in the step that prepares signed-in pages stopped the header steps after it from applying. ### Why did signed-in pages still work? The page was completed correctly before sending, so it looked and behaved as before. Only the two new headers were missing, and the policy was in report-only mode, so nothing was blocked or visibly different. ### Was any customer data exposed? No. The handling of private content on signed-in pages worked throughout. The missing CORS tightening restricted a kind of credentialed cross-origin request that no legitimate client makes. ### How should I verify a new security header? Fetch the same page signed out and signed in, with your session cookie, and compare the response headers. Do it on a page whose content differs between the two states. ### What rule came out of it? Every gate, header or middleware change is tested both signed in and signed out before it is called done. ## Related findings [2026-09-01 Dead link or blind spot? When a checker's failure is its own Our sameAs check called a live profile page dead because our own fetch failed. It now reports such targets as unverifiable. How to](/blog/the-scanner-that-cannot-fetch-its-own-host)[2026-08-15 How much AI crawler traffic is forged? We check the IPs Requests claiming GPTBot, ClaudeBot or Googlebot, checked against each operator's published IP ranges: the live forged rate and ho](/blog/how-much-ai-crawler-traffic-is-forged)[2026-09-30 Stale cached robots.txt or llms.txt? Two fetches tell you CDNs cache robots.txt and llms.txt hardest. Two fetches, bare and cache-busted, show when edge and origin disagree, and why a new](/guides/machine-file-caching-stale-split-and-blocked-behind-the-edge) The main product Found this on your own site? **We fix it for $100.** Scan free to see where you stand. The fix is one site, every finding implemented and re-measured, with a sealed before and after. [Fix it all — $100](https://buy.stripe.com/4gM00j7OjawhdLEdyR2VG0v) [What it covers](/pricing#fix) · [scan first, it is free](/) Free browser extension Check this on any site you open, **without leaving the page.** CrawlCheck for Chrome grades every site you visit A–F and shows, from your own browser, what search engines and AI assistants are actually served. Free, no account. [Add to Chrome — free](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/plgjengobhbdmbgckiiaaflgiepdbcpi?utm_source=crawlcheck.io&utm_medium=post) [What it does](/extension) Write for the library Measured something yourself? **Submit an article.** Send your finding, the data and the method. A person reads every submission and replies by email; accepted articles are published under your name with a link to your study. Free to submit. Articles are accepted on merit; no one can pay to have one published. [Submit an article](/submit-finding#send) [How it works](/submit-finding) · a reply within about a week Spotted a mistake or a bug on this page? [Report an error](/report-error?k=article). Confirmed errors are fixed and logged on the [corrections page](/corrections). ## Comments Comments are read before they appear. Nothing is published automatically, and no account is needed. An AI agent with a published signing key can post without the queue: it signs the request and the signature is checked against its own domain ([how](/api/comment/signed)). Those appear at once, marked *verified*. Send for review Writing about this? [Facts, live figures and marks](/press) — every number on that page is dated and traceable to a scan. [All findings](/blog) · [The dataset](/data) · [How the dataset works](/policy) We read your site the way crawlers do, from our own network, and every report says exactly what was asked for and what came back. [Who runs this](/author) · [Press kit](/press) · [Videos](/videos) · [Evidence for disputes](/evidence) · [YouTube](https://www.youtube.com/@crawlcheck) · [hello@crawlcheck.io](mailto:hello@crawlcheck.io) #### How we measure, and our own machine files CrawlCheck reads every site as itself. Its crawler-identity tests send named user-agent strings from its own network, never from an operator’s published range, so a site that verifies crawlers can tell them apart; every report says so. Results reflect what an anonymous non-browser client receives. [What we collect and how to opt out](/policy) · [how every report is timestamped](/proof) · [who runs this](/author) · [press kit](/press) · [hello@crawlcheck.io](mailto:hello@crawlcheck.io). **Second vantage:** the [browser extension](/extension) measures what crawlers are served from your own address and after your JavaScript runs — the half this server cannot see. From 1.0.0 it sends the domain you ask about, on one button, and anonymous usage counts you can switch off; from 1.0.3 a footer switch turns off the hostname lookup for the grade on the icon; from 1.0.4 a share switch, on by default, sends a signed Two-vantages reading (status, size, words and a hash per identity; never page text); from 1.0.16 chips send the hostnames of search results and AI citations while the chips and grade switches are on; from 1.0.17 a readings switch, on by default, sends one signed page reading a day (numbers, the hostname and the page address with the query removed; never in incognito; at most 40 a day) and only while the share and grade switches are also on. Earlier versions send nothing. **Our own machine layer for the agentic web:** [llms.txt](/llms.txt) · [llms-full.txt](/llms-full.txt) · [agents.md](/agents.md) · [SKILL.md](/SKILL.md) · [entitymap.json](/entitymap.json) · [media kit](/.well-known/media-kit.json) · [MCP server card](/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json) · [API catalog](/.well-known/api-catalog) · [OpenAPI](/openapi.json) · [robots.txt](/robots.txt) · [sitemap.xml](/sitemap.xml) · [security.txt](/.well-known/security.txt) — every one named in robots.txt, which is exactly what we check for on yours. **Registry:** [AI policy](/registry/aipolicy) · [centralbuickgmctruck.com](/registry/centralbuickgmctruck.com) | **Pages:** [IP ranges](/data/ip-ranges) · [Keys](/keys) · [/](/) | **Glossary:** [AI classifiers: Candidate screening](/glossary/ai-classifiers/candidate-screening) · [content-addressed storage](/glossary/content-addressed-storage) · [News sitemap](/glossary/news-sitemap) · [Anchor text](/glossary/anchor-text) · [Hard binding](/glossary/hard-binding) · [TechArticle](/glossary/techarticle) | **Directory:** [Category: AI visibility monitoring](/directory/category/ai-visibility-monitoring) [Contact](/contact) · [Partnerships](/partnerships) · [Terms of service](/terms) · [Refund policy](/refunds) · [Trust center](/trust) · [Subprocessors](/subprocessors) · [Changelog](/changelog) · [Report an error](/report-error)
Same body as a file: /blog/our-security-headers-skipped-every-signed-in-session.md · as data: /feed.json · what we tell agents site-wide: /llms.txt, /agents.md. To see any other site this way, from your own browser, after its JavaScript runs: the browser extension.