CrawlCheck

Conformance

Test any CrawlCheck verifier

19 real bundles and receipts of crawlcheck.io’s own scans, each with the exact output a conforming verifier must give. The negative fixtures change one thing and name the one check that must fail. Expected outputs were written from each change, not by running the verifier.

node run.mjs — run.mjs downloads the verifier and every fixture, runs them and exits 1 on any disagreement. Index with every file’s SHA-256: index.json. Built 2026-10-01T14:39:35.511Z against verifier 46206b177cc941e1.

FixtureGroupWhat it isExpectedMust fail
valid-v3-anchoredvalidA manifest-v3 bundle of a Bitcoin-anchored day, with the subject and every leaf: every check runs and passes.verified offline · accepted
valid-v2-legacylegacyA manifest-v2 bundle (before sealed roots, 2026-09-30): the three root checks cannot run and say why; nothing fails.verified offline · accepted, partial
valid-pre-manifestlegacyA record from before evidence manifests (2026-09-20): manifest, key and signature checks cannot run; the record digest still folds to its day's root.verified offline · reject
incomplete-anonymousincompleteThe same record as downloaded without a licence: the subject and the leaves are withheld, so those checks cannot run - never a pass.verified offline · accepted, partial
stale-unsealedincompleteA record whose day has not been sealed yet: the seal and timestamp checks cannot run.verified offline · accepted, partial
tampered-manifest-bytestamperedOne space appended to the manifest body: it no longer hashes to the digest that was signed.not verified · rejectmanifest_hash
tampered-signaturetamperedOne character of the signature changed.not verified · rejectsignature
wrong-keytamperedThe bundle carries a different public key under the original key id.not verified · rejectkey_id signature
tampered-subjecttamperedOne character of the sealed subject changed: it no longer hashes to the record digest.not verified · rejectsubject_hash subject_binds
contradictory-report-idtamperedThe bundle says it is a different report than the one the sealed subject names.not verified · rejectsubject_binds
tampered-merkle-pathtamperedOne sibling hash on the path to the day's root changed.not verified · rejectmerkle_path
timestamp-of-another-daytamperedThe .ots proof of another day is attached: it timestamps a different root.not verified · rejectots_commits_root
tampered-lineage-leaftamperedOne business fact's count changed.not verified · rejectlineage_root
duplicated-experience-leaftamperedThe fetch whose leaf sorts last is listed twice. The Merkle root is IDENTICAL (an odd node pairs with itself), so only the leaf count can catch it; the body also no longer matches its signed digest.not verified · rejectmanifest_hash experience_root
extra-decision-leaftamperedA decision the scan never made is added to the leaves.not verified · rejectdecision_root
missing-experiencetamperedOne fetch removed from the manifest body (the body then no longer matches its signed digest either).not verified · rejectmanifest_hash experience_root
receipt-validreceiptA remediation receipt signed with the observer's published key.verified offline · accepted
receipt-tamperedreceiptThe verdict of a signed receipt changed.not verified · rejectreceipt_hash signature
receipt-foreign-keyreceiptA doctored receipt re-signed with someone else's key. Every check a verifier can run offline passes; its key id is not the published one. A conforming CONSUMER must reject it by comparing key ids with the directory. the receipt's key id RBj_N824fPZv7FrIuMSNHFizOevhnUneNWoQNqz2pDs is not in https://crawlcheck.io/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directoryverified offline · reject

Two more suites

The bundles above test integrity. These test the two questions an agent asks next: may it act on a decision receipt, and was the receipt signed by the right key at that time. Each case states the exact expected answer; every one of our verifiers (the script above, @crawlcheck/sdk, crawlcheck for Python) runs them on every change.

SuiteCasesWhat it settlesFiles
guard-acceptance64may an agent act on this decision receipt? Every guard must refuse expired, future, over-lifetime, other-domain, other-action, replayed, wrong-operation, tampered, foreign-key and wrong-purpose receipts, and the redirects that leave the receipt's domaincases.json · runner
key-policy26which key may sign which document when: the purpose a document needs at its signing time, keys before their start, retired keys inside and outside their window (a rotated decision key included), compromised keys, the bound exception during a switch, foreign keyscases.json

a conforming verifier returns exactly the expected value (true / false / null) for every listed check and the expected overall verdict; null means the check cannot run and must say why, never pass.

Verified is not permission. verified is the offline result: every check that could run passed. It is never permission to act. Rely on a document only when a verifier given the published key directory (published_kids, or the live directory) returns accepted: true; accepted_strict also requires that no check was left unable to run. Act only when, in addition, the decision allows the action and the record is fresh enough for it. Each fixture states the four values (integrity_valid, issuer_trusted, accepted, accepted_strict) under expected.with_key_directory in the index, and run.mjs checks them.